Nudging policymakers : a case study of the role and influence of academic policy analysis by Turner, Karen et al.
Nudging policymakers: a case study of the role and
influence of academic policy analysis
Karen Turnera, Oluwafisayo Alabia and Julia Raceb
aCentre for Energy Policy, School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde,
Glasgow, UK; bDepartment of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Marine Engineering, University of
Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
ABSTRACT
As countries around the world face the monumental challenge of transitioning
to low or net zero carbon economies, there is an important opportunity for
public policy and political science learnings and models to underpin crucial
shifts in policy strategies and decision-making in an arena dominated to date
by technical thinking and problem-solving. In this essay we demonstrate
how we, as academics working in the fields of political economics and
engineering, employed policy science knowledge about building coalitions
around polysemic ideas to advance the debate about large scale (industrial
decarbonization) climate change solutions in the UK.
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Introduction
Our aim in writing this essay is to present our experience in playing a direct
role in advancing policy discussions on the potential use of carbon capture,
use and storage (CCUS) in the UK as a demonstration of the value of academic
knowledge in framing policy decisions. We are a team of two academic econ-
omists (homed in a School of Government and Policy) and an academic engin-
eer (from an industry background), with a track record in academic and policy
circles for applied political economy focussed contributions to policy debates
around the role of CCUS and other decarbonization solutions in addressing
the challenge of climate change and the transition to low or net zero societies
or economies. In late 2017 we were asked by officials at the UK Department for
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to help the Government
reframe the debate on climate change in general and CCUS in particular,
with the specific aim of fostering a more consensus driven approach.
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What we present here is a case study based on our experience in consider-
ing the role and application of public policy and political science learnings and
models in developing ideas and narratives. In particular, our case study
focuses on how academics can play the role of policy entrepreneurs in exploit-
ing policy windows to use ideas and narratives as coalition magnets that
empower and nudge policymakers in developing strategies to address the
challenge of meeting ambitious climate change targets.
We hope that the particular focus of our case study will help other policy
scientists to take advantage of the policy window in the arena of climate
policy and ‘net zero’ pathway and policy formulation. This policy window
remains very much open in the UK, particularly since the 2019 declaration
of the Government’s ambition to transition to a net zero economy by
2050.1 For example, the Westminster Parliament is currently in the process
of further broadening consultation on delivering the net zero transition, not
least by convening a Citizen’s Assembly. 2 Thus, one of our aims in writing
for this Policy Forum is to help set foundations for other public policy analysts
to inform and impact the development of policy strategies and actions in the
broader ‘net zero’ domain.
The evolving climate policy challenge and the opportunity to
position outselves as policy entrepreneurs
In thewake of the UNFCCC (2015) Paris Agreement, and anticipating the advice
of the UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2019) to set targets for a ‘net
zero carbon’ economy by 2050, a policy window opened in the UK as Govern-
ment acted to stimulate a range of consultative processes around what such a
target implies and potential routes to achieving it. Despite academic and policy
debates, and climate policy still largely dominated by technology-focussed
questions, we recognized that Government’s concern lay in the fact that the
net zero transition is a challenge that requires transformative and system
level changes in how people live and do business. It had begun to reconsider
its approach to climate and underpinning energy policy, until then the respon-
sibility of a single ministry (the Department of Energy and Climate Change,
DECC), in a broader public policy context. This was reflected in a restructure
of Whitehall departments, with DECC merged into a new Department of
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and with HM Treasury (the
overall economic and finance ministry in the UK) taking a more prominent
role in reviewing policy targets and actions. The transformational nature of
the new twenty-first Century challenge of transitioning the economy to a
point where there is no further negative impact on the global climate also
arguably led to the opening of the policy window of albeit constrained consul-
tation in the top-down Westminster model of government (Richardson, 2018).
Here, we as a team of policy scientists recognized that government officials
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and politicians were activity seeking support for – and possibly sharing of
responsibility in – a process of identifying and pursuing pathways for a net
zero transition that would be a the same time technically effective and
viable in a political economy context (Dudley, 2013).
In positioning ourselves to participate in the policy process at this point, we
focussed on the crucial implication that social and political science research
foundations, combined with enhanced stakeholder engagement, must
become increasingly important in supporting the required policy environ-
ment. We already had an existing portfolio of research – largely funded by
the UK’s publicly funded research councils – focussing on the political
economy implications and context of decarbonization actions, and already
delivering high relevant outputs.3 Thus, we secured ‘Impact Accelerator’
funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(EPSRC) and approached BEIS officials with the offer of partnering in exploit-
ing our work and expertise in resetting policy questions and developing new
ideas and approaches in advancing the policy debate.
At this point we presented BEIS with a basic idea that builds on the knowl-
edge and evidence base provided by our research. The idea focuses on the
need to decarbonize while sustaining the contribution of high value industries
in generating jobs and incomes. We were at the time having discussions with
various teams in BEIS (and with HM Treasury regarding analytical approches).
However, we focussed on setting the idea in the context of a potential role for
large-scale CCUS in delivering industrial decarbonization policy may ensure a
‘sustained contribution’ to the UK economy from our (high value) energy sup-
plying and intensive-use industries (and their respective supply chains). CCUS
a technological solution that ‘cleans’ production processes by capturing CO2
before it enters the atmosphere and transporting it for use in other processes
or geological storage. It is increasingly regarded as necessary if the deep dec-
arbonization ambitions of the 2015 Paris Agreement are to be achieved (IPCC,
2018). On the other hand, it is also a very costly solution with a troubled policy
history in the UK, by and large for fiscal and economic reasons (set out below).
Thus, our ‘sustained contribution’ idea was an appealing one to BEIS
officials, who were more generally challenged in their newly formed ministry
to find a route to co-existence of action to support (a) the need for powerful
dynamic change implied by the UK’s climate change ambitions and (b) the
stability of industry policy. That is, there was a clear need to shift away from
embedded perceptions of economy-environment rivalry (Dudley & Richard-
son, 1996).
Of course, our ‘sustained contribution’ idea is applicable in other contexts.
However, CCUS context was of particular interest to BEIS at the particular time
that we offered to partner with them on our EPSRC Impact Accelerator work. It
also provides the best example for the case study we present here. This is
because a set of circumstances developed through which we could articulate
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our idea and gain legitimacy for it within the community where a strategically
important coalition could form.
The particular policy challenge for CCUS: tailoring our idea and
role as policy entrepreneurs
The response of BEIS officials to our offer of a partnership was to request that
we build on our recognized expertise in analysing the wider political economy
implications of different activities, with the aim of developing our idea into a
narrative around the potential role of CCUS in decarbonizing high value UK
industry sectors. Crucially, they asked if we could work to build consensus
around that narrative across a community of industry, technology and
policy stakeholders, and to do so within the framework of a CCUS Cost Chal-
lenge Taskforce (CCTF) being set up on the instruction of the (then) UK Min-
ister of State for Energy and Clean Growth (Claire Perry).4 The aim of the BEIS
officials was to build and secure the support of existing CCUS stakeholders
and experts in for potential Government support for CCUS in the new
context: the newly formulated UK Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017). The need
for consensus building was amplified in the case of CCUS, where a troubled
history of repeated withdrawal of Government support for previous pilot
studies and programmes (generally focussed on decarbonizing the energy
system rather than industry) had culminated in the (then) Chancellor of the
Exchequer, George Osborne’s much lamented (among CCUS developers,
researchers and industry stakeholders) decision to withdraw support for the
most recent CCUS development programme (the CCUS Commercialisation
Competition) in his 2015 Autumn Budget Statement.5
The Budget Statement itself did not provide an explanation for this
decision, but a subsequent spending review by the National Audit Office
noted that, while agreeing with the (then) Department for Energy and
Climate Change (DECC) that CCUS is required to meet UK carbon targets,
‘HM Treasury [the Chancellor’s Ministry] raised concerns about the merits
of the carbon capture and storage competition given fiscal constraints’
(National Audit Office, 2016, p. 7). In response, several important reports,
perhaps most notably ‘the Oxburgh report’ (Parliamentary Advisory Group
on CCS [PAGCCS], 2016) argued an urgent need to reconsider the approach
to CCUS development and deployment in the UK. Both the cited reports
clearly recognize the need to reconsider the role of CCUS, in line with inter-
nationally accepted scientific advice that it is necessary to deliver the type of
net zero outcomes that the UK was intending to develop firm targets to
meet (IPCC, 2018).
It was the challenge of establishing how a required large scale and costly
technological solution can be supported and deployed in a manner that is
consistent with the fiscal and economic well-being of the nation that
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motivated the new Minister of State for Energy and Clean Growth (in her lea-
dership role of the new BEIS ministry that encompassed the former DECC6) to
set up the CCTF in 2018. The remit handed to the CCTF was to make rec-
ommendations to inform the Government’s intended ‘CCUS Action Plan’ as
part of the ongoing development of the UK Industrial Strategy.
In turn, it was this CCTF initiative that BEIS officials asked us to engage with.
Our Turner and Race (2016) intervention, explaining our own understanding
of the Chancellor’s 2015 decision, helped set us up as policy entrepreneurs
with the type of balanced perspective required to build consensus in now
the case for CCUS may be reconsidered in the UK. This, combined with our
expertise in technically informed economy-wide modelling and scenario ana-
lyses for a range of decarbonization solutions, and, of course, the initial idea
we had set out, motivated the BEIS request for us to develop the narrative,
underpinned by a solid evidence base that would be acceptable to HM Treas-
ury and a wider policy stakeholder community.
This is the point at which we took on the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’
(Kingdon, 1995). Considering Béland and Cox’s (2016) ‘Ideas as Coaltion
Magnets’ model, we were implicitly challenged to do two things. First, to
appropriate and/or reframe a broad ‘polysemic’ idea (here focussed on econ-
omic/societal outcomes). Second, to gain legitimacy for the idea via engage-
ment with a group of stakeholders/experts (less familiar with such ideas)
brought together by a major decision-maker to consider a specific policy pre-
scription. However, here we also draw on Dudley’s (2013) arguments regard-
ing the need, while keeping the idea sufficiently ambiguous to appeal across
interest groups and permit flexibility in building the coalition, to give it
sufficient factual and cognitive content that it anchors to real world events
and dynamics.
Preparing to building consensus around our idea: setting out an
appealing narrative
BEIS officials informally framed the need for our activity in terms of ‘setting out
a narrative around which broad consensus may develop’ for CCUS in the UK.
While setting out a narrative around our sustained contribution idea fell natu-
rally into our field of expertise of technically informed economy-wide impact
analysis, the need to build consensus took us into less familiar terrain. More-
over, we are new to the field of using ideas and narratives to build consensus
in a manner that ultimately empowers policy-makers to take transformative
action. This element of the challenge led us to study the public policy litera-
ture to inform our work. We also sought advice from our political science col-
leagues in the School of Government Policy at the University of Strathclyde,
who directed us to a wealth of relevant writings that we drew on in conduct-
ing our work, and cite through this essay.
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In addition to building our understanding of how to compose and com-
municate a narrative, a key insight emerging from discussions with our
colleagues and writings in policy sciences is how we, as new policy entre-
preneurs developing ideas and narratives, need to recognize that ideas are
often destabilizing agents, and will be resisted if stakeholders fear that
their interests will be affected (Dudley & Richardson, 1996; Richardson,
2000). Recognition of this issue was crucial. Our expectation had been
that members of the CCTF – as a group of industry and technology stake-
holders directly impacted by and/or concerned with promoting the role of
CCUS – would be open to engaging with our idea and narrative on the
basis that we ‘talk the same language’ as HM Treasury, the ministry
responsible for the fiscal and economic decision making that could
‘make or break’ the case for CCUS in the UK. That is, while the ‘sustained
contribution’ idea would not be familiar to them at the outset, we had
believed CCTF members would welcome our idea and narrative on the
basis of its likely resonance with the policy decision-making hierarchy
(including politicians more generally concerned with economic well-
being and jobs). Thus, we proceeded with caution in preparing to
engage with the CCTF.
Our first step was to develop a non-technical policy brief (Turner et al.,
2018) that set out our idea concerning the potential for CCUS (if it can be
deployed as a competitive decarbonization solution) to sustain economic
value generation, including jobs, in a wide range of sectors across the
UK economy. In an attempt to make the narrative appealing in terms of
its trustworthiness with economic decision makers in government, we
decided to link it to existing government data on industry activity and
employment set out as ‘employment multipliers’ (how many jobs are
required, via indirect supply chain linkages, across the wider economy
per direct job or monetary unit of industry demand).7 Multipliers are
reported for all UK industries, including the energy supplying and intensive
use industries where CCUS activity may take place. They are generated
through a simpler, but not inconsistent, method of economy-wide model-
ling that we (and HM Treasury) more commonly use in applied analysis. The
key point is that they constitute a familiar and transparent metric with a
broader policy stakeholder community in the UK and, thus, did not over-
complicate the idea or narrative we needed to communicate and building
consensus around.
In terms of the ‘story’ told, the narrative was articulated around the fact that
substantial (public and private) investments have already been made in the
industries that need to decarbonize, and that this has enabled significant
and continued value generation, including supporting many direct industry
and indirect supply chain jobs across the UK economy. We did not limit the
articulation of our idea to jobs/employment but did make this the primary
6 K. TURNER ET AL.
way of framing the narrative. This was motivated by wider political and public
concern in the UK over how the (then) low (now zero) carbon transition may
impact on both citizens’ sources of income, and the associated income tax
revenues that are the single largest source of public revenues at national
level.8 This meant that we were implicitly attempting to set the idea in
terms of economic justice through the sustainability (and desired continued
growth) of jobs and industry, and how UK citizens and society will ultimately
pay for the transition (through a range of price and income changes). It is also
consistent with broadening of the earlier idea of ‘sustainability’ (one of the
examples of ideas as coalition magnets considered by Béland & Cox, 2016)
to bridge concerns for the environment with support for continued economic
growth (e.g., see Adger & Jordan, 2009; Edwards, 2005).
In focussing attention on jobs, we also considered the impact of attaching
both positive and negative emotive qualities to our idea. That is, we did set
out the potential for competitive decarbonization through investment in
and deployment of CCUS to sustain and potentially grow the contribution
of high value UK industries. But we also set out the potential for extensive
job losses if energy intensive supplying and/or using industries were to relo-
cate from the UK in the absence of competitive decarbonization solutions
(including the prospect of overly costly CCUS). We acknowledge that, as
argued by Cox and Béland (2013), ideas with strong positive emotional
quality, or valence, may have broader appeal and bemore productive in build-
ing coalitions. We would also would associate our ‘sustained contribution’
idea with Dudley’s (2013, p. 1142) argument that effective narratives ‘can
provide a reassuring perspective of continuity, even amidst major change’.
But at the stage of developing, articulating and communicating the idea
and narrative, we considered that identifying potential negative valence
associated with losing jobs may help articulate the need to consider economic
(and social) justice and distributional implications for a wider societal commu-
nity. We considered that this may be particularly useful in the context of the
more technically focussed CCTF audience being less familiar with economic-
value arguments, but where, as individual citizens/human beings, they could
not help but be aware of media and public debate around job losses when
industries decline and/or disappear.
The consultation process
Given the understanding we had gained from the literature as to how our pol-
itical economy focussed idea and narrative could be destabilizing, we began
our consultation in a staged manner. Before the CCTF even began to meet,
and throughout the process of drafting the Turner et al. (2018) brief
(January-March 2018), we engaged in an iterative process of engagement
with BEIS officials and other stakeholders (some but not all of whom would
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be directly involved in the CCTF). More generally, we put significant weight on
the role of discourse as a coalition-building device (Schmidt, 2008, 2011), both
in communicating the idea and building our own influence through using our
research record to underpin the idea. We formally submitted the brief to the
CCTF when it began to meet in March 2018, following up with a formal pres-
entation and discussion at a steering group meeting in April 2018. The latter
was necessary to gain the full attention of CCTF members and ensure their
understanding of the narrative and its resonance with policy decision
makers. We decided that, of the three of us, Karen Turner should be the
one to go in person, given that she has the most extensive expertise on the
political economy side of our work, and in engaging with economic and
fiscal decision makers. That is, our judgement was that it was crucial the nar-
rative was conveyed, explained and contextualized by the member of our
team most familiar with the reasons as to why a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision may
be made on economic and fiscal grounds. Of all the CCTF community
present, industry stakeholders responded most positively. Those concerned
with developing CCUS technology were clearly more wary but, on balance,
the session went well, though it was not clear at that point end whether con-
sensus was secured or the narrative would be reflected in the CCTF
recommendations.
We knew that the CCTF would consult more widely in considering their
report. Therefore, alongside the process of directly engaging with them,
we also engaged and articulated our idea via an EU-level initiative that
involved several of the same actors and was led by the Zero Emissions Plat-
form (ZEP, an industry-focussed network set up under the EC European Stra-
tegic Energy Plan, or SET-plan, to consider the role of CCUS). 9 This initiative
involved producing a report primarily aimed at European Commission (EC)
decision-makers on the potential role of CCUS in delivering on the mid-
century ambitions of the Paris Agreement. The Turner et al. (2018) brief
informed that work also. In this context, we had more power in influencing
the outcome, with Karen Turner invited to co-lead the resulting report.
There, our idea was extended, again with illustrative use of employment
and GDP multiplier metrics, in the context of a pilot CCUS project at the
Port of Rotterdam (the Netherlands) and how this may impact industry
both there and, via supply chain linkages, in Germany. This additional
engagement may provide an example of how our ‘sustained contribution’
idea and narrative is applicable and can be transplanted across national
boundaries, and into supranational arenas (Dudley & Richardson, 1999).
However, the key point for our case study here is that involvement in the
ZEP project most likely added to the legitimacy of our idea, and to our
role and power to influence the discourse at home by setting our idea in
a broader European policy context (particularly with the ZEP report being
published within days of the CCTF one).10
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The first tangible outcome: the target community incorporate
our idea in their own narrative
The outcome of the CCTF engagement with our idea (and the accompanying
narrative) was that the CCTF did in fact use it, and cite the Turner et al. (2018)
brief, in setting out a recommendation in their July 2018 report to Govern-
ment that specifically reflecting it in a distinct recommendation. The headline
Recommendation (albeit only ranking at #9 of 16), was worded as follows:
Working with industry, Government to more fully assess value of CCUS to the
wider UK economy (including in terms of utilising existing infrastructure, skills
capacity, and supporting opportunities for future clean growth and develop-
ment). CCUS CCTF (2018, p. 10)
The section of the report (CCUS CCTF, p.24) that explains this recommen-
dation cites the factual content (employment multiplier evidence) set out in
our brief. On the other hand, the wording of the headline recommendation
reflects the more polysemic nature of the idea, highlighting several potential
outcome areas that will be valued by actors with various interests and prefer-
ences. That is, the CCTF refine our narrative in a way that they feel will speak to
their own stakeholder community. For example, the oil and gas industry –
which may provide carbon transport and storage services – has interest in
implications for infrastructure, while labour organizations are concerned
with maintaining skills levels, and environmental interest groups are con-
cerned with clean economic development pathways. While the headline rec-
ommendation translates our idea with a heavy positive valence, the fuller text
(p.24) cites our brief in the context of setting out the more negative ‘we may
lose what we have’ connotation:
‘Failure to deploy CCUS early increases the risk that these jobs and industries dis-
appear from the economy… .[W]ith the right policy signals from Government,
CCUS can help to ensure that the jobs of the skilled workforce are retained
… ..’ (CCUS CCTF, 2018, p. 24)
The emerging policy prescription and narrative presented by
government
The second, but ultimately key outcome emerges through the response of the
BEIS actors within Government, who had requested the development of our
‘sustained contribution’ idea and narrative in the first place. They reflect our
idea and narrative in their own policy formulation, which the CCTF was set
up to report to.
This outcome takes effect through the publication of the UK Government
CCUS Action Plan in November 2018 (BEIS, 2018), which coincided with an
‘Accelerating CCUS’ conference, organized by BEIS with the International
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Energy Agency and several other bodies in Edinburgh, Scotland.11 This docu-
ment (BEIS, 2018, p. 29) sets our idea in the context of a proposition to deploy
CCUS in industrial centres (or clusters) as part of the UK Industrial Strategy,
and citing both the aforementioned Oxburgh report (PAGCCS, 2016) and
the CCUS CCTF (2018) report. That is, while BEIS could have taken our idea
directly – and indeed their Action Plan document more directly reflects the
wording and content of narrative than the CCTF report does – on one
level they set it within the context of emerging through a broader consultative
process.
On the other hand, BEIS do directly reflect the narrative that they asked us
to develop, with the Turner et al. (2018) brief being directly cited and
our language around the ‘sustained contribution’ adopted in the text. They
also take the interesting step of explicitly identifying us as policy influencers:
on p.16 of the BEIS (2018) Action Plan we are cited as one of the ‘ideas foun-
dations’ of the UK Industrial Strategy, and, within the key on the next page,
there is a statement that we conduct ‘world-leading research into the econ-
omic impacts of CCUS’ (BEIS, 2018, p. 17). This wording is no doubt intended
to further empower BEIS in adopting the ‘sustained contribution’ narrative,
through associating it with us as a reputable research and knowledge base.
Again, the way the idea and narrative are communicated by those who
have accepted it is interesting. At the point in the text where the idea is articu-
lated, BEIS (2018, p. 29) draw on both the specific language used (e.g., ‘sus-
tained contribution’) and the employment multiplier examples given, as
reflected in the following paragraph:
At a local and regional level, direct high value jobs in capital intensive industries,
such as oil and gas, chemicals, and other energy intensive industries have been
shown to support up to four jobs in indirect employment (Turner et al., 2018).
Decarbonising these industries, potentially through deployment of CCUS,
allows their sustained contribution to economic growth both nationally and in
the regions in which the industry is concentrated. This is a key reason why
CCUS is being progressed in other European industrial centres such as the
Port of Rotterdam. Furthermore, skills and supply chains from the oil and gas
and chemicals industries could transition to service a growing CCUS industry,
allowing the retention and creation of further high value jobs. (BEIS, 2018, p. 29)
There are a couple of particularly interesting features of how the idea is articu-
lated as a policy proposition here. First, while the coalition scale that the UK
Government was aiming at is national one, the international context is
emphasized in the reference to Rotterdam. This could be motivated by the
need to gain legitimacy for UK action in a global economy setting. Another
potential motivation for the specific mention of Rotterdam may be the poten-
tial to lose ‘early mover’ and competitive advantage in proceeding with dec-
arbonization activity in a global economy context (i.e., giving the impression
that Rotterdam is already doing it).
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The second interesting feature is that what we intended as basic illustrative
examples of evidence through presentation of ‘employment multiplier’ data
in the Turner et al. (2018) brief is again (as in the CCTF report) cited as
more explicit evidence (‘up to four jobs in indirect employment’). This may
simply be reflective of a perceived need to show that propositions are under-
pinned by knowledge of the nature and number of jobs concerned, and/or of
the scale of the challenge being addressed. On the other hand, particularly
given that (as noted above) BEIS used the language of ‘narrative’ development
at the outset of the process outlined here, it may be suggestive of the UK Gov-
ernment attempting to move beyond the more polysemic and positive
valence idea of potential economic benefits to develop a narrative to under-
pin specific policy action.
In this context, we consider the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) proposition
of Jones and McBeth (2010) that is further developed and debated in (Gottlieb
et al., 2018; Jones & Radaelli, 2015; Peterson & Jones, 2016). A key feature of the
NPF is that it requires a clear epistemology including the standards used to
establish the accuracy and ‘truth’ of conjectures, perceptions and findings,
and has a set of elements in terms of the setting, characters, plot and ‘moral
of the story’ (Jones & Radaelli, 2015). In this type of setting, it has been
argued (e.g., by Janda & Topouzi, 2015) that energy policy narratives, generally
being technology focussed, lack human characters (victims, villains and heroes)
to build a story around. But here, if indeed a narrative is being developed, the
use of our idea around economic sustainability enables BEIS (2018) to set out
a story that aligns with the elements of the NPF. That is, the setting is the
need for industries to decarbonize. Characters can be identified in terms of
potential victims (workers and their jobs), a villain (the risk of decisions being
take on decarbonization actions that harm industry competitiveness relative
to the Rotterdam case), and a hero in the form of government/industry collab-
oration in developing a competitive CCUS infrastructure to service UK industry
clusters. In terms of the plot-line and ‘moral of the story’, this would require scen-
ario analysis for potential pathways to introducing CCUS in an industry cluster
context, which in turn adds to the need to develop an evidence base.
Conclusion: what lessons have we learned?
So what can we learn from the case example set out above around our role as
academic policy entrepreneurs in the context of advancing discussions on the
development of a CCUS policy proposition in the UK? Our crucial starting
point was that we approached Government officials (BEIS) who were chal-
lenged to progress an area of climate policy decision making that is likely
to require some form of public support in a political economy environment.
This set the stage for them to invite us to set out an idea and narrative that
has both broad/polysemic features and a solid factual basis that links to the
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current dynamic policy context. They worked with us on the refinement of the
narrative and directed us to a community with whom they needed to build
consensus around a shift in framing and focus of policy on CCUS.
Our idea reflected the political economy concerns of another set of policy
decision makers (HM Treasury) who had been responsible for the halt of pre-
vious CCUS policy action. It did so by focussing on the need for a ‘sustained
contribution’ to the UK economy from (what are currently) our energy supply-
ing and intensive-use industries (and their respective supply chains) through-
out the dynamic process of system level change demanded by the UK’s mid-
century net zero ambitions. Thus, our idea speaks to the need for a policy sol-
ution that can both meet its central aim, decarbonization, while also deliver-
ing outcomes that line up the wider UK industrial policy and the need to
prioritize sustained fiscal and economic performance.
This is not necessarily a new idea to those concerned with industrial strat-
egy development, public finance or economic policy. But it was less familiar to
the community of experts and stakeholders assembled (in the form of the
CCUS CCTF) by a major decision maker (the responsible Government minister)
to consider a specific policy prescription (on investment and deployment of
CCUS) and with whom we were attempting to build a consensus. The main
obstacle we anticipated was that our politically economy focussed idea, and
our entry (with two of us being economists) into the process of policy formu-
lation in an area that had previously been technology and project cost
focussed, would be seen as unseating or taking priority over the stakeholder
community’s own interests. However, this was less of an obstacle than we
feared and the acceptance of our idea was more straightforward and more
successful than we anticipated.
In the end, we did gain legitimacy for our ‘sustainable contribution’ idea
through a consensus building process. That a coalition did form in the CCTF
community around our idea is evidenced by how it is reflected in one of the rec-
ommendations made to Government by that community (via the CCUS CCTF,
2018, report). The outcome was that the support of the coalition then empow-
ered Government officials to reflect the idea in a policy proposal (the BEIS, 2018,
‘CCUS Action Plan) for the deployment of CCUS in industrial clusters.
One perspective we could take on the outcome at the interim stage of the
CCTF report is that this community were already operating in the context of a
recent change in the institutional structure of UK Government (i.e., CCUS,
along with other areas of climate policy sit within the new cross-cutting
BEIS ministry), and had been through the experience of having their interests
set aside in the fiscal budgetary process that previously halted policy action
on CCUS. Thus, we may conclude that they no doubt recognized a benefit
in listening to and adopting – at least to an extent that they perceived as
useful to their own ends – an idea and narrative proposed by us as experts
who ‘speak the same language’ as those who hold decision making power.
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On the other hand, the process and outcome could be reinterpreted in a
way that suggests we never really faced a serious obstacle in gaining legiti-
macy and building support for our idea. The initial challenge was not one
of persuading a community (the CCTF) to support a policy proposal (invest-
ment and deployment of CCUS) that they were in any way averse to (most
of the CCTF community were supporters of CCUS). Rather, the challenge
was to get them to agree on a new and unfamiliar (to them) way of thinking
about the proposal. Those involved in the CCTF arguably still did not hold any
real interest in considering the wider economic outcomes that may emerge
from CCUS, and retained an interest only in making CCUS happen for techni-
cal reasons. Rather, their engagement with and adoption of our idea possibly
only happened because it was clear to the CCTF that those in the policy
decision-making hierarchy value it.
This may also be part of the reason that the negative valence (risk of job
losses if appropriate action is not taken) that we built into the idea alongside
the positive valence (enabling jobs to sustain and grow if effective action is
taken) was attractive to the CCTF. The language of the CCTF recommendation
clearly aimed to highlight the wider economic risk of not considering CCUS as
part of the portfolio of measures required to meet ambitious climate change
targets. On the other hand, this negative valence is immediately set in the
positive context of the UK gaining international competitive advantage, if
Government ‘sends the right policy signals’. In this context, the CCTF also
responded to our illustrative evidence (which originated from Government’s
own statistical reporting) set out in our brief in a form trusted by UK policy
decision makers (the employment multipliers), and cited it in their own report-
ing. On the other hand, when Government articulated the idea at the stage of
policy proposal (via the BEIS, 2018, CCUS Action Plan) the positive valence/
reassuring perspective of our idea was much more heavily emphasized.
What is clear is that the immediate policy audience, and instigators of the
coalition building process (BEIS), once empowered by the CCTF recommen-
dation, more directly used our interpretation of the underpinning evidence
in setting out their policy prescription (in the BEIS, 2018, CCUS Action Plan).
The key characteristic of BEIS as policy actors in this process was that they
understood and accepted our idea from the outset and instigated our role
as policy entrepreneurs to build legitimacy and support for it. This was
clearly to the end of empowering them to develop the narrative that they ulti-
mately put forward in their policy document.
Thus, perhaps the key lesson emerging is the need for academic policy
entrepreneurs to identify, directly approach and effectively engage the
policy decision-makers with the greatest stake in listening to what we have
to say. Impacting policy decision-making and/or advancing policy discourse
through building consensus around the ideas we generate from our research
is not necessarily a linear process that ultimately takes us from our research
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base, through dissemination and engagement to the policy outcome. Rather,
in our experience, the key to gaining impact for academic research that can
support policy processes is to understand what the desired end point of
the process is for policy decision makers. With this foundation we can deter-
mine the role that our knowledge and input can play – crucially considering
the extent to which simplifying written material and analyses may be more
effective than original academic outputs – and identify the collaborators,
and wider policy science knowledge base, that can support us in playing a
productive role in advancing policy discussions and outcomes.
Notes






3. Information on our own research programme can be found at https://www.
strath.ac.uk/humanities/centreforenergypolicy/.
4. See information on the CCUS CCTF at https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/
ccus-cost-challenge-taskforce.
5. The progress of CCUS in the UK can be tracked on line, including an item on the
2015 cancellation of the CCS Commercialisation Competition, at the periodically




7. Employment multiplier data for all UK industries are produced by the UK Office





9. Information on the EC SET-plan can be found at https://setis.ec.europa.eu/setis-
reports/setis-magazine/carbon-capture-utilisation-and-storage/set-plan-update.
Information on ZEP can be found at http://www.zeroemissionsplatform.eu/.
10. The ZEP report can be found at https://zeroemissionsplatform.eu/role-of-ccus-
in-a-below-2-degrees-scenario/.
11. Information on the Accelerating CCUS conference can be found at https://
ccusglobalconference.com/files/CCUS-Conference-Programme.pdf
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